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Abstract
There were once again high expectations that a major global health event - the Ebola virus outbreak of 2014-
2015 - would trigger meaningfully World Health Organization (WHO) reform and strengthen global health 
governance (GHG). Rather than a “turning point,” however, the global community has gone back to business as 
usual. This has occurred against a backdrop of worldwide political turmoil, characterised by a growing rejection 
of existing political leaders and state-centric institutions. Debates about GHG so far have given insufficient 
attention to the need for institutional innovation. This entails rethinking the traditional bureaucratic model of 
postwar intergovernmental organizations which is disconnected from the transboundary, fast-paced nature of 
today’s globalizing world.
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More than halfway through 2016, a year Ilona Kickbusch describes as “a turning point for global health” amid “new political realities and global 
insecurities,”1 there are indeed signs of change. However, 
the direction of travels appears to be away from collective 
action. Right- and left-wing populist movements across many 
western liberal democracies (spanning the Syriza Party in 
Greece to the National Front in France) have expressed their 
voices, for example, through the UK referendum vote to leave 
the European Union (EU), and nomination of Donald Trump 
as the Republican Party’s US presidential candidate. Many see 
these developments as a populist rejection of globalization.2,3 
Meanwhile, the issues requiring global cooperation continue 
unabated including major conflicts across the Middle East; 
unprecedented migration flows; volatility of global financial 
markets; and a perilously warming world (July 2016 being the 
hottest on record).
Given this crowded global agenda, the Ebola debacle has 
faded from recent memory and global health has retreated 
from the world’s headlines. Attention has shifted elsewhere 
and it is difficult to spot a “turning point,” or even the blinking 
of a turn signal, in global health governance (GHG). There 
are a few who remain hopeful for meaningful reform of the 
World Health Organization (WHO) signalled, for example, 
by the creation of the Health Emergencies Programme “to 
help countries prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover 
from emergencies quickly, in a more predictable, dependable 
and accountable way, whether these are caused by disease 
outbreaks, disasters or conflict.”4 There are many others who 
are sceptical that the organization has the capacity to reform 
itself.5-7 WHO’s formal mandate and structure remains 
fundamentally unchanged. Member states refuse to increase 
resources or adopt a different funding model. Painfully 
familiar conversations have ensued or, worse, gone silent.
Business as Usual: An Outmoded State
Kickbusch is correct that many of the multilateral institutions 
created after the Second World War, to maintain international 
peace and security, are obsolete. The United Nations (UN) 
system, along with the thousands of intergovernmental (or 
international governmental) organizations created since 
1945, are an extension of the European notion of the “state” as 
it evolved out of the Peace of Westphalia (1648). As Richard 
Falk writes:
“One of the seemingly permanent contributions of Europe 
to the manner of organizing international society was to 
create a strong consensus in support of the idea that only a 
territorially delimited sovereign state is entitled to the full 
privileges of membership. The United Nations [UN], the 
institutional embodiment of international society, recognizes 
this principle by limiting membership in the Organization to 
‘states.’”8
This state-based notion of world order remains embedded in 
international law and organizational theory, as well as, efforts 
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to understand global insecurity and strengthen collective 
action.
In this context, politics continues to be primarily defined 
in terms of states and their relative power. Kickbusch 
refers to a “power shift” towards emerging economies, 
and a reconfiguration of the international order – from 
postwar superpower rivalry, to the United States as “lonely 
superpower,”9 to a multipolar world.1 On the one hand, 
multipolarity is expected to generate a degree of friction 
as states jostle and settle into new positions of political 
and economic power. Consensus can be more difficult to 
achieve in international negotiations while this shifting 
occurs. On the other hand, Kickbusch describes a “diffusion” 
of power to more states, and with it, new opportunities for 
collective action. While traditional aid donors may retreat 
to prioritising “national interests and foreign policy goals,” 
increased South-South cooperation offers new potential. 
She concludes that “a much wider range of countries now 
possesses the means that are constitutive for participation 
in global governance: endogenous resources, transnational 
connectivity, and geopolitical status.”1 The crowded calendar 
of intergovernmental meetings to address climate change, 
trade and investment, sustainable development, transnational 
crime, corporate accountability, and umpteen other global 
issues seems to provide evidence of the robust health of global 
governance.
Winston Churchill famously stated that it is always better 
to “jaw, jaw than to war, war.”10 Good governance, however, 
needs to be measured by more than the number of meetings 
where jawing occurs, but also who’s doing the talking. 
The problem with casting global problems in terms of the 
divergent interests, unequal resources and resultant conflicts 
of states, and their solutions as primarily dependent on states 
negotiating with other states, is the glaring neglect of interests, 
ideas and institutions that do not conform to national borders. 
International relations in the early 21st century is more 
fraught, not just because some states are getting stronger, and 
others are getting weaker, but because political identity and 
interests are more complex. And Westphalian-based political 
institutions alone are unable to represent and mediate among 
them. In other words, understanding the “new political 
realities” emerging must go beyond scorecards of which 
states are rising and falling, the growth of newly emerging 
economies, and the shift to multipolarity. If we are to reframe 
debates about GHG, we need to recognise the disconnect 
between our political institutions and new polities emerging. 
We cannot continue business as usual but need to recognise 
that there are deeper political changes afoot.
Global Change in an Era of Angry Politics
The real “political realities” challenging global governance 
stem from the acceleration of neoliberal-based market 
globalization, since the late twentieth century, which has 
restructured the global political economy in ways suited 
to the interests of the few over the many. Unprecedented 
wealth has been generated, but the ensuing costs and benefits 
are being unfairly distributed. The first concerted push 
back against this new world order arose during the 1999 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference 
which surprised negotiators by its ferocity and political 
breadth. Negotiations were eventually relaunched as the 
Doha Development Agenda, with a continued belief that 
“global problems can be addressed through a multilateral 
framework” of WTO’s then 142 member states.11 In 2011, 
the Occupy Movement formed to oppose a global financial 
system dominated by large corporations, and characterised 
by inequality and instability. The claims that a multipolar 
world is emerging positively imply a wider sharing of power 
among a greater number of states. However, this is belied 
by the fact that the wealth of 62 people is equivalent to that 
owned by half the world’s population.12 Intergovernmental 
governance is seen as failing to redress, and indeed forms part 
of, the structural conditions which facilitate stark inequities.13 
While the Occupy Movement was criticised for lacking 
vision and depth, and soon dispersed without achieving real 
change, political disenchantment has continued to simmer 
among “the 99%” buffeted by globalization. The leak of 11.5 
million offshore financial records in April 2016, known as 
the Panama Papers, seems to confirm that systemic flaws in 
global capitalism indeed stack the cards in favour of the super 
rich and powerful.14
In 2016, therefore, the “turning point” reached may be that 
sufficient numbers of the voting public across the political 
spectrum are so unhappy with their political leaders and 
institutions that they are seeking radical change. On the 
political left, many have lost faith in the capacity of existing 
political institutions to serve the public interest and ensure 
social equity. On the political right, governments are seen as 
failing to protect local jobs, control immigration, and thus, 
national interests. As one article in Der Spiegel summed up: 
“Whether they are fans of Donald Trump, supporters of Brexit 
or Marine Le Pen voters in France, ‘angry voters’ have one thing 
in common: They have been left in the dust by globalization.”15
Implications for Global Health Governance: The 
Innovation Gap
The search for effective GHG cannot be separated from this 
worldwide political turmoil. When WHO was established 
in 1948, its design and agreed functions reflected a desire 
to re-establish and maintain a peaceful world order built on 
an international states system. Governed by the principle 
of one state, one vote, the political bodies of WHO (namely 
the World Health Assembly, Executive Board and regional 
committees) are intended to provide member states the 
opportunity to collectively set goals, agree priorities and 
allocate resources. The postwar design of WHO in 1948 also 
adopted Max Weber’s bureaucratic model which consists of a 
functional hierarchy of authority, a departmental separation 
of duties, standardised procedures, and an established set of 
policies or rules.16
Fast forward almost 70 years and the political limitations 
of WHO’s postwar structure are woefully apparent. The 
organization might point to its 193 member states and claim 
to be universally representative, but it is far from politically 
inclusive. Like the political alienation felt by millions around 
the world, many members of the global health community has 
turned elsewhere to move issues forward and get things done. 
Moreover, WHO’s Weberian bureaucracy worked well during 
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periods of stability or slow change. However, as Jamali et al 
write: “weaknesses were gradually exposed with accelerating 
globalization and technological innovation.”17
In the business world, successful firms adapt to change through 
institutional innovation in the form of new organizational 
models and management paradigms. Institutional innovation 
concerns “redefining the rationale for institutions and 
developing new relationship architectures within and across 
institutions to break existing performance trade-offs and 
expand the realm of what is possible….[thus] creating smarter 
institutions that can thrive in a world of exponential change”.18 
On the occasion of its one-hundredth birthday, IBM ran an 
advertisement in the New York Times which read:
“Nearly all the companies our grandparents admired have 
disappeared. Of the top 25 industrial corporations in the 
United States in 1900, only two remained on that list at 
the start of the 1960s. And of the top 25 companies on the 
fortune 500 in 1961, only six remain there today….”19
In fact, the situation is even grimmer. As Denning writes, the 
average life expectancy of a Fortune 500 company has declined 
from around 75 years half a century ago, to less than 15 years 
today. The reason is the accelerated pace of uncertainty and 
change in the world economy.20 The clear lesson for firms has 
been to adapt or die.
What we see is a steady decline of WHO, clinging furiously 
to obsolete political institutions and bureaucratic model, yet 
kept alive by member states as an essential public institution. 
This decline is not because WHO is not needed, but because 
it has not adapted to a changing world. It is not the WHO 
that we need today. In other parts of the health sector, 
innovation thinking has been embraced. We see an explosion 
of novel applications of new technologies for healthcare 
or healthcare systems. Mobile devices, for example, are 
being used for everything from diagnostics, to healthy 
lifestyle messaging, to post operative monitoring. We also 
see innovation thinking in the planetary conceptualisation 
of health problems and their solutions. A good example is 
the Blue Dot project at the University of Toronto, Toronto, 
ON, Canada which brings together geographic information 
systems, spatial analytics, data visualization, and computer 
science to model how infectious diseases spread and impact 
populations worldwide.21 Beyond the health sector, the world 
is swirling with institutional innovations in this “age of post-
bureaucracy”16 – crowd funding, open source learning, and the 
sharing economy are a few examples. An increasing number of 
examples come from the public sector.22  Political innovation 
must become a fundamental part of this conversation. How 
might open source learning be used to strengthen the capacity 
to participate in global health politics? How might virtual and 
interactive town halls improve communication between global 
health policy-makers and the constituencies they serve? How 
might the closed world of global policy-making be opened 
up and strengthened through virtual public consultations, 
feedback systems and monitoring systems? How might the 
concept of global citizenship become institutionalized within 
our global health institutions?
Conclusion
Debates about WHO reform and strengthening GHG to date 
have been insufficiently informed by institutional innovation 
thinking. Both diagnoses and design of remedial measures 
continue to focus on the state and intergovernmental 
institutions. This approach, limited to tinkering with a 
bureaucratic model inherited from the postwar era, seems 
strangely detached from the broader political turmoil 
unfolding around the world. Globalization has created new 
collective health needs which cross old spatial, temporal and 
cognitive boundaries. In response, we need GHG institutions 
which represent the many, not the few; are sufficiently nimble 
to act effectively in a fast-paced world; and capable of bringing 
together the best ideas and boundary spanning knowledge 
available.
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